Direct Applicability of Generally Accepted Principles of International Law in Legal Order of the Republic of Slovenia by Olaj, Anton
141Olaj, A. (2013). Direct Applicability of Generally Accepted Principles of 
International Law in Legal Order of the Republic of Slovenia. 
Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, XI(3–4), 141–159.
Direct Applicability of Generally 
Accepted Principles of International 
Law in Legal Order of the Republic of 
Slovenia
UDK: 341(497.4)
Anton Olaj
anton.olaj@gmail.com
AbstrAct
Self-executing, incorporated and generally accepted principles of international 
law have been used directly in legal order of the Republic of Slovenia. 
Systematic records of these identified and enforced norms do not exist. It is 
difficult for lawyers and judges to get acquainted with them. The predicament 
is even greater because, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, a translation of the relevant case law of international 
tribunals is not available. Generally accepted principles of international law 
are applicable in Slovenian legal order per se. Despite that, it is not entirely 
clear how administrative bodies should react in situations where the rights 
and obligations of legal entities are on the one hand regulated by law and 
customary international law but on the other hand are contradictory.
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1 Introduction
The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia defines relations between 
international law and domestic law in the 8th Article of the Constitution, 
which determines: “Laws and regulations must comply with generally 
accepted principles of international law and with treaties that are binding 
on Slovenia. Ratified and published treaties shall be applied directly.” We 
can see that international law enters into Slovenian legislation in the form of 
treaties and in the form of generally accepted principles of international law. 
It should be noted that European law as foreign law sui generis also enters into 
domestic legal order, not in context of the 8th Article of the Constitution, but 
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according to the provisions of the third paragraph of the 3rd/a Article of the 
Constitution, which will not be discussed in this paper.
Legal experts have diverging opinions of what is to be understood by the 
phrase ‘generally accepted principles of international law’. In the literature, it 
can also be traced under the phrase ‘customary rules of general international 
law’.1  For the purposes of this article, we will use the decision of the 
Constitutional Court, which will serve as a legal framework for understanding 
this syntagm. The Constitutional Court states that the term ‘generally 
accepted principles of international law’ covers a primarily “international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” and “general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations”. They are enumerated as 
the source of international law in the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice in bullets b) and c) of the first paragraph of the 38th Article (US, U-I-
266/04-105). Customary law constitutes an important part of international 
law, but due to its unwritten form, it requires a proof of the action’s nature 
and motives. (Zemanek & Hartley, 1998, p. 149). Fitzmaurice states that their 
codification can also occur in treaties or records in various international 
documents (Sancin, 2009, p. 51). It consists of an objective and a subjective 
element. A proof of general practice is an objective element. A subjective 
element is opinio juris sive necessitati. This means that countries act in a certain 
way because they are aware that such an action is obligatory for them by the 
rules of international law. Schwarzenberger indicates that both conditions 
must be fulfilled cumulatively (Thirlway, 1972, p. 46). The general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations can be understood as the greatest common 
denominator of fundamental principles historically formed within a domestic 
legal system (Pogačnik, 1999b, p. 470), for example the principle of legality, 
the principle of non-retroactivity, the principle of res judicata, the litispidenca, 
the principle of unjustified enrichment, the principle of lex specialis derogat 
legi generalis (Škrk, 2007, p. 282–283) and the principle actor sequitur forum 
rei (US U-I-245/00). Additionally, Türk appoints two more principles: the first 
one stating that no one can transfer to another person more rights than 
they themself have; and the second is the principle of bona fides (2007, p. 
59). In the works of scholars Bartos, Guggenheim, Andrassy, Shaw and Pell, 
the following can also be found: the principle of prohibition of abuse of law, 
the principle of the prohibition of unjustified enrichment,  the principle of 
non-favorable treatment from own mistakes, the principle of limitation, the 
principle of obligations to compensate for damage, the principle nemo plus 
iuris ad alium transfers potest quam ipse habet, the principle of estoppel, the 
principle of the right to exclusion of a judge, the principle of equality of the 
parties, the principle of audiatur et altera pars, the principle of res judicata and 
the principle of nemo iudex in sua causa (Vukas, 1992, p. 259).
The syntagms ‘customary international law’ and ‘customary rules of general 
international law’ are repeatedly stated in this article. It should be mentioned 
1 More about this Škrk, 2012, p. 1104–1106.
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that this is just short for “international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law”, which is written in the 38th Article of the Statute 
of International Court of Justice. In this article, this phrase is understood in 
the context of the syntagm “generally accepted principles of international 
law”, specified in the 8th Article of  the Constitution and which customary 
international law is an integral part of. And vice versa, when the article states 
the syntagm ‘generally accepted principles of international law’, specified in 
the 8th Article of the Constitution, both “customary international law” as well 
as “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are meant in this 
case and are specified in bullets b) and c) of the first paragraph of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice’s 38th Article.
International law is applicable in Slovenian internal law, either directly or 
indirectly, by previous transformation or adoption into domestic law. The 
subject of this article’s study will be the direct applicability of generally 
accepted principles of international law, therefore an indirect applicability of 
international norms will not be defined in more detail.
Readers should not be confused by the article’s various references to treaties, 
while the title of this article does not mention treaties and they are not a 
theme of this research. The reason is that a doctrine is richer in examining 
an issue of direct applicability and self-executing norms of international law 
framed by a treaty. In international law, there is no hierarchy of international 
legal sources.2 As a source of international law, treaties theoretically have the 
same importance as customary rules of general international law and general 
principles of law. It is logical that certain findings in the field of treaties 
shall apply mutatis mutandis idem quod to generally accepted principles of 
international law.
2 Definition of the Problem
The norms of international law take effect in domestic law only if the state has 
determined it (Türk, 2007, p. 71). However, there are exceptions, also known 
as ius cogens. In these types of international imperative rules, it is not required 
that the state in any way takes part in their formation. These norms become 
binding on a State at the moment when it becomes an international legal 
subject (Platiše, 2005, p. 185). Countries vary depending on the procedures 
by which they give effect to international law on their territory. Most of 
them accept the doctrine that international law is a part of domestic legal 
order. In spite of different procedures in domestic legal systems of countries, 
international law with its demands nevertheless takes effect on their area 
(Jennings & Watts, 1997, p. 53).
As to the effect of international law in the legal order of the Republic of 
Slovenia in the segment of generally accepted principles of international law, 
the Slovenian Constitution does not provide for explicit direct applicability, 
2 More about this Škrk, 1985, p. 149–150, and Villinger, 1997, p. 58.
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while it does in the case of ratified and published treaties (Pogačnik, 1999b, p. 
472). A purely linguistic understanding of the 8th Article of the Constitution 
indicates doubt whether it is permissible to use generally accepted principles 
of international law directly. We already know the answer to this question, 
because there already exists case law that justifies their direct applicability. 
However, there are still open questions, particularly regarding the recognition 
of the existence of such norms and their direct application by administrative 
bodies.
3 Legal Acculturation of International Law in the Legal Order 
of the Republic of Slovenia
There are three methods of reception of international law in Slovenian 
legal order. The first is Statutory ad hoc incorporation. It is actually a 
transformation of international law by an act of legislature and thereby for 
indirect applicability of international law. In doing so, a norm of international 
law loses the nature of an international norm and becomes a domestic legal 
norm. A typical example of transformation of international norms are norms 
in the field of criminal law because of law principles nullum crimen nulla poena 
sine lege praevia.
The second method to take on international law is automatic ad hoc 
incorporation. Under this approach, the international rules apply in the 
domestic legal system only if the legislative authority adopts a specific 
implementing law without reformulating these rules (Hofmann, 2008, p. 93). 
In the Slovenian legal framework, this means the adoption of treaties with a 
law on ratification or with a government decree on ratification. By this act, an 
international norm does not lose its legal nature, therefore it remains a norm 
of international law, because it does not interfere with its content.
The third method of the legal acculturation of international law, which is 
relevant for the purposes of this article, is an automatic standing incorporation. 
It is valid for the entry of generally accepted principles of international law into 
domestic legislation, which are as such, per se, a source of domestic law. The 
Constitution, in the 8th Article, specifies that laws and regulations must comply 
with generally accepted principles of international law. This presumption 
declares their incorporation into Slovenian legislation without domestic legal 
instrument of ratification, which also applies to treaties (Weingerl, 2002, p. 
355). This means that the public authorities and individuals must ipso facto 
and without any conduct respect in the international community established 
rules of customary international law, states Cassese (Škrk, 2007, p. 279). By 
this act, an international norm does not lose its legal nature and remains a 
norm of international law, because it does not interfere with its content.
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4 Identifying the Contents of Generally Accepted Principles 
of International Law
Before using the established rules of customary international law, they 
must be previously identified. The only verifiable manner of establishing 
the existence and contents of a customary rule prior to use, citing Kreča, is 
suitable judgment of the International Court of Justice. Theoretically, in 
this case, there is no transformation of a customary rule but only the court’s 
finding of existence of a customary rule (Kreća, 2006, p. 23). Grasselli argues 
that in addition to the courts, Slovenian administrative bodies themselves also 
identify content of international law before using it. With courts specifically, 
he mentions that they take into account the resources of the 38th Article3 of 
the Statute of International Court of Justice, including judicial decisions and 
the views of highly qualified international legal experts (Šturm, 2002, p. 143).
It should be emphasized that the courts and legal experts do not create 
international norms, they only note their existence and interpret them. Case 
law and doctrine are only ancillary legal sources that help crystallize the 
meaning and importance of the three main formal legal sources, i.e. treaties, 
customary international law and general principles of law.
When reviewing Slovenian websites of providers of electronic legal 
information Legal Information System of the Republic of Slovenia, Register of 
Regulations of the Republic of Slovenia, TAX-FIN-LEX and IUS INFO, it can be 
noticed that there are no systematically collected contents of all applicable 
norms in the field of international law but only those that have been an 
act of ratification published in the official gazette. The area of treaties is 
regulated in a systematic way, but quite the opposite goes for generally 
accepted principles of international law, even if in exceptional cases they do 
exist in written form. One can be informed about the established norms of 
customary international law only as far as the content can be found in the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court, which is published in official gazette. 
However, in the official gazette for example, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between 
International Organizations of 1986 cannot be found, although it is known 
that there are codified norms of customary international law applicable in 
the legal order of the Republic Slovenia per se. The same goes for the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 38th Article: “1. The Court, whose function is 
to decide in accordance with international law in such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules explicitly 
recognized by the states in conflict; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to 
the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
international publicists, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This 
provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the 
parties agree on it.”
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Generally accepted principles of international law are primarily unwritten 
sources of law. Therefore, they can be found in some of the judgments of 
international tribunals.4 Lawyers can also help themselves with the case law of 
the Constitutional Court, which have been rejected or identified as unwritten 
norms of customary international law.5 Specialized literature in the field of 
customary international law, where recognized international legal experts 
deal with concrete matters of this kind, may also be of assistance. Some legal 
contents that may be helpful in recognizing general customary international 
law are also publicly available on specific websites. For example: Juridical 
Yearbook at http://www.un.org/law/UNJuridicalYearbook/index.htm; League 
of Nations Treaty Series at http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/; United 
Nations Treaty Series at http://treaties.un.org/; Repertoire of the practice of 
the United Nations with regard to questions of international law at http://
www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/; Reports of International Arbitral Awards at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/index.html.
But there is an additional difficulty. In Slovenia, there is no legal provision 
for precise translation of the relevant decisions of international judicial and 
arbitral tribunals, with the exception of judgments of the European Court of 
Justice.6 These types of decisions are also not collected in one place. In the 
United States of America, the American Law Institute has released a collection 
with the name ‘The principles of the Restatement of the Law’. With it, users 
can familiarize themselves with the established customary rules of general 
international law. Such a collection, especially if it was accurately translated, 
would be an appropriate tool for judges and lawyers in Slovenia.
However, the identified content of customary norms of international law is 
only the first step towards its implementation. In order to take effect between 
legal entities, it must not only be directly applicable but also self-executing.
5 Understanding the Syntagm ‘Direct Applicability’ of 
International Law Norms
The concepts that are connected with the subject of this research can 
be understood differently. In foreign literature, the syntagm ‘domestic 
applicability’ is at times equated with the syntagm ‘domestic direct 
applicability’. It is also used for marking of ‘self-executing’ norms (Iwasawa, 
1998, p. 46; Conforti & Francioni, 1997, p. 237). Schermers puts forward a 
similar distinction. He argues that the syntagm ‘directly applicable’ is used as a 
synonym for ‘directly effective’ and ‘self-executing’ (Müllerson, 2000, p. 195).
4 For example: Permanent Court of International Justice, International Court of Justice, 
International Criminal Court, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Dispute Settlement Body, 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
5 For example: US U-I-90/91, US Up-97/02, US Up-114/05.
6 The Government of the Republic of Slovenia in 2007 adopted decision No. 02500-1/9/2007 on 
the establishment of the project “Translation and Redaction of Judgments of the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance” For its implementation, the government 
entrusted the Job to the Office of Legislation.
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Regarding the diversity of application of the sytagm in doctrine, what should 
therefore be understood by the Slovenian constitutional provision in the 8th 
Article, which states that the international norm is directly applicable?
In its decision from 1997, the Constitutional Court stated that the directly 
applicable legal norms are those that govern the rights and obligations of 
entities of domestic law and may, for example, be applied directly by the 
court (US Rm-1/97). This was followed by the 1998 decision of the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Slovenia, which stated that the direct applicability 
of treaties means that “the courts in the application of their provisions can 
directly refer to it as the provisions of domestic law and, more importantly, 
courts can use them without being streamed into domestic legislation. This 
means that they are part of domestic law, giving an advantage before the 
law” (VS II Ips 55/98).
The syntagm ‘direct applicability’ of norms is thus in the Slovenian judicial 
decisions understood as a label for rules that are, due to their precision in 
creating rights and obligations of entities, self-executing. A question arises 
regarding whether the generally accepted principles of international law 
that are not formulated in a sufficiently precise manner may not be directly 
applicable?
Pogačnik explains that the syntagm ‘directly applicable’ from the 8th Article 
of the Constitution should be understood primarily as an adoption of treaties 
into legal order of the Republic of Slovenia in the context of establishment 
of their domestic validity, but not automatically in the sense of their self-
execution (1999b, p. 481). Furthermore, Pogačnik thinks that considering the 
nature of the customary rules of general international law, in the case of the 
existence of a model of constitutional adoption of their contents, in principle 
there is no obstacle for the self-executing, whenever the norm is sufficiently 
specified (Grad et al., 2002, p. 322). Ilešič joins him, saying that each directly 
applicable provision is not self-executing and continues by saying that on the 
contrary only a provision that is directly applicable can have a self-executing 
effect (1997, p. 1326). Also, otherwise there exists a recognition that some 
norms of customary international law are directly applicable and some are 
not, some directly applicable norms are also self-executing and some are not 
(Sik et al., 1994, p. 159).
Considering the judicial decisions and clarifications of the doctrine, it can 
be concluded that the syntagm ‘direct applicability’ must be understood 
more broadly. It must be understood as a hypernym that includes both 
self-executing international norms as well as those that are not sufficiently 
precise to be self-executing and only serve as a source for legal authorities 
when creating new legal acts.
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6 Understanding the syntagm ‘self-executing’ norms of 
international law
The syntagm ‘self-executing’ was derived from U.S. law and is used to 
describe the contractual provisions that are directly applicable in the courts. 
The syntagm ‘self-executing’ is in other legal systems understood in the 
same sense, indicates Leary, but goes on to say that the real meaning of self-
executing rules is very different in different legal systems (1982, p. 70).
It can be observed in the literature that the term ‘direct applicability’ is in English 
presented also as ‘self-executing’, in German ‘unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit’ 
and in French ‘direct effect’ or the ‘applicabilité directe’ (Verhelle, 1996 , 
p. 168). Alen and Pas consider that there is no commonly agreed definition 
in the law or jurisprudence about the syntagm ‘self-executing’. In addition, 
its meaning depends on the constitutional law of each legal system (ibid, p. 
165). Rudolf also thinks that there is no established legal definition of a ‘self-
executing’ norm, because this phrase is an invention of lawyers and professors. 
It is a matter of domestic law of each country which norms are self-executing 
(Tunkin & Rüdiger, 1988, pp. 47–48), so it happens that a specific rule, which is 
based upon a treaty or derived from international custom, is self-executing in 
the domestic law of a certain country, but in another country it does not have 
these features. Rudolf states the example of the 6th Article of the Convention 
for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which in 
Germany is a self-executing norm but not in Austria, where a rule-making 
intervention by the State is necessary in order for this norm to be used (Ibid, 
p. 42). Leary says that the courts of different countries use different criteria 
(or the same criteria in different ways) in establishing which norm provision 
is self-executing.  The result is that some norm provisions are used directly in 
the courts of a certain state but not in the courts of some other state (1982, 
p. 71). So, the treatment of an individual norm depends on the legal system 
of each state, says Tunkin (Tunkin & Rüdiger, 1988, pp. 46–47). On the other 
hand, Mazzeschi thinks that the problem of self-executing norms is not just 
a matter of domestic law but a mixed issue that concerns both international 
and constitutional law. International law contains some general knowledge 
about the existence of self-executing rules. But since this issue also affects 
the competent authorities of the state and the procedure of implementation 
of these international norms, it is also a matter of constitutional law 
(Randelzhofer & Tomuschat, 1999, p. 207).
What qualities must an international norm therefore have in order to be self-
executing?
Müllerson states that self-executing norms of international law are those 
legal rules whose characteristics can be used by entities of individual countries 
in domestic courts where international law (whether derived from treaties 
or from customary international law or both) is directly applicable (2000 p. 
194–195). Norms that are too imprecise, of course, cannot be self-executing 
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(Sik et al., 1994, p. 159). Self-executing norms include not only those that 
govern the rights of individuals but also those that the court evaluates to 
have the legal power of an administrative act, states Ergec (Verhelle, 1996, 
p. 172). Such are provisions of a treaty that govern extradition, state Jacobs 
and Roberts (ibid).
The doctrine recognizes that when establishing the existence of a self-
executing norm in a treaty, two issues have to be clarified. Andre and Wouter 
distinguish two criteria, that is the objective and the subjective criterion. Both 
must be given together, that is cumulatively. The subjective criterion is to 
be found in the purpose and aims of the parties of treaty. If the contracting 
parties express consent and declare that the contractual obligation is 
recorded as self-executing, then these norms in the baseline can be regarded 
as such. However, most of the parties do not express such intention so clearly, 
especially in the case of multilateral treaties. The second, an objective criterion, 
means that the text of a treaty provision must be sufficiently clear and exact 
to be self-executing in court (Alan & Belt, 1996, pp. 170–171). Conforti adds 
a criterion that in the treaty there should not exist a prior request for such 
norm to be legislatively concretized (Conforti & Francioni, 1997, p. 85). Alan 
and Pas consider that an objective criterion is crucial (1996, p. 172).
Iwasana has a similar opinion about self-execution. He believes that what 
needs to be established first is whether the parties of the treaty completely 
excluded the direct applicability of the treaty provisions themselves. If the 
treaty contains such a provision, the direct applicability of norms is rejected. 
In this case, the direct use of norm is associated with the contractual intent of 
the parties. Secondly, if the direct applicability of a treaty is not excluded, only 
then the examination of individual rules should take place to find out whether 
they are sufficiently precise. In customary international law, only the second 
possibility of determining self-executing is applicable (1998, pp. 153–154). 
Perenič has a similar opinion and states that even before the international 
law is used in the domestic law of the Republic of Slovenia, the competent 
authority must clarify whether a specific international act should even be 
applied in a certain relation. To get the answer to this question, they must 
first ascertain whether it is a legally binding act. When there is no longer any 
dispute, they must determine who is committed to this act. Many international 
legal acts regulate only relations between the Contracting States, but there 
is also an increasing number of those that apply to individuals, such as the 
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It 
is also important to determine whether the international act is completely 
general or if it is specific enough to be used directly without additional 
regulations in domestic law. The third issue that the competent authorities 
should clarify regarding the use of international acts in domestic law is 
whether it is properly incorporated in the domestic legal system (1996, p. 9).
These conditions of the doctrine in international law that relate to self-
executing norms are similar and comparable to those used in the case law 
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of the Court of Justice of the European Union and refer to European law. It is 
a question of direct effect in European law. The European Union represents 
a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states 
have limited their sovereign rights. This law does not require any legislative 
intervention (Škrk, 2005, p. 7), which the European Court of Justice ruled 
in 1963 in the case of ‘Van Gend & Loos’ (ECJ Case 26/62), thus justifying 
the doctrine of direct effect. This means that if some legal injunction has 
a direct effect, the individuals have a right that the national courts must 
protect (Hartley, 1998, p. 177). Winter argues that the concept of a ‘direct 
effect’ of a norm indicates a possibility for an individual to directly refer to 
such norm in proceedings that run within their legal order (Ilešič, 1997, p. 
1325). Citing Hayley, the Court has established four conditions for, according 
to the provisions of European Union law, the direct effect to be recognized. 
The provision of the law must be: 1) clear, 2) unconditional, 3) in the form of 
prohibitions and 4) without reservation that would condition the use of the 
European legal norm in legal order of Member States on a positive legislation 
of a Member State (Sancin, 2009, p. 87).
Proprius signum norms of international law, which can be characterized as 
self-executing at the user’s own understanding are: clarity, unconditionality, 
precision, completeness, editing rights and obligations of natural and legal 
persons.
7 Direct Applicability of Generally Accepted Principles of 
International Law
In 1998, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia faced the audit claim 
that the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia does not allow for direct 
applicability of customary international law but held that this view cannot 
be accepted. It is true that the second sentence of the 8th Article of the 
Constitution states that ratified and published treaties are directly applicable, 
which means that the courts, in the application of their provisions, directly 
refer to it as the provisions of domestic law, without being streamed into 
domestic legislation. However, this does not mean that the judge cannot 
apply the principles of international law. When the Constitution requires 
the compliance of laws with generally accepted principles of international 
law (the 153rd Article of the Constitution) and thus gives the advantage of 
principles before the laws, it is clear that at a trial these principles are used 
(VS II Ips 55/98). In addition, this is also clear in the 3rd article of the Court 
Act,7 which determines that in the course of the judicial function, the judge is 
bound to the general principles of international law as well as to the ratified 
and published treaties.
7 Courts Act (Official Gazette of RS, no. 19/94 et seq.) 3rd Article: “In the performance of the 
judicial function, the judge is bound to the Constitution and the law. In accordance with the 
Constitution, they are also bound to the general principles of international law as well as 
ratified and published treaties.”
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Although the generally accepted principles of international law are used in the 
Slovenian legal order per se, it is not fully clear how the administrative bodies 
should respond in situations where the rights and obligations of legal entities 
are at the same time protected by law and well-established international 
law but are contradictory.8 More information concerning this issue is already 
known, but it refers to judges of the courts and not to the administrative 
bodies. However, the matter may be relevant in finding answers relating to 
the decisions made by administrative bodies.
Testen thinks that if the judge believes that the law that should be applied is 
inconsistent with the hierarchical superior provisions of treaties, he must stop 
the proceedings and initiate proceedings at the Constitutional Court (2003, 
p. 1,488). However, Novak states that if the judge of a court or any other 
governmental authority, including administrative bodies, when solving some 
issues, finds conflicting provisions of  treaty and law, they should resolve the 
matter on the basis of a treaty. In doing so, they do not decide on the (in)
validity of a provision of domestic law but only on its (non)applicability in the 
current case, in which the directly applicable international norm prevailed 
(1997, p. 30). Zupancic has a similar opinion. He thinks that the 125th and 
the 160th Articles of the Constitution do not exclude each other, saying that 
the Constitutional Court decides about conflict between a law and generally 
accepted principles of international law in an abstract manner, while the 
ordinary courts decide only for actual cases (Zupancic, 2010, p. 8). Testen 
argues that the provision of the 8th Article of the Constitution cannot serve 
as an argument that the Constitution in relation to treaties should withdraw 
from the system of concentrated constitutional review of constitutionality of 
laws (2003, p. 1,488). He justifies this with interpretations of Constitutional 
Court decisions no. U-I-154/93, U-I-77/93 and U-I-103/95. Furthermore, Testen 
believes that at first glance it could result that the Constitutional Court 
indicated a possibility for the treaty to change the statutory provisions in a 
manner that they derogate, due to the principle of direct applicability. But in 
his opinion, a more precise reading of the decision of the Constitutional Court 
can only lead to the conclusion that a treaty with individual self-executing 
provisions can only complement the law (Ibid, p. 1,492). From decisions 
I-154/93, UI-77/93 and UI-103/95, we can roughly deduce the following:
• A judge does not decide according to the uncoordinated law but 
according to the directly applicable norm of international law, which is 
also a self-executing one (UI-154/93).
• A judge does not decide according to the uncoordinated law and he 
does not decide according to the otherwise directly applicable rule of 
international law, because this international norm is not self-executing 
(UI-77/93).
8 For example, Fiscal Balance Act in its 188th and 246th Article deviate significantly from the 
binding provisions of the ILO Convention no. 158. These provisions also deviate significantly 
from the provisions of Directive 2006/54 EC and Council Directive 2000/78/EC, which binds on 
Slovenia on the basis of the 288th article of the Lisbon Treaty (OJ C 306/01).
152 International Public Administration Review, Vol. XI, No. 3–4/2013
Anton Olaj
•	 A	 judge	uses	both	 legal	norms	 (domestic	 law	and	 international	 law),	
which	are	complementary	(UI-103/95).
The	above	paragraph	presents	opinions	that	relate	to	practices	of	judges	of	
courts	but	do	not	relate	to	practices	of	the	administrative	bodies,	with	the	
exception	 of	 Novak	 who	 thinks	 that	 the	 administrative	 bodies	 who,	 while	
resolving	some	issues,	encounter	conflicts	between	provisions	of	treaties	and	
laws,	need	to	resolve	the	matter	on	the	basis	of	the	rules	of	treaties	(1997,	
p.	30).
How	should	the	administrative	bodies	therefore	respond	in	situations	where	
the	rights	and	obligations	of	legal	entities	are	at	the	same	time	protected	by	
law	and	established	international	law	but	are	contradictory?	This	is	in	fact	a	
question	of	compliance	of	a	 certain	 statutory	norm	with	a	certain	norm	of	
international	 law9	 and	 the	 question	 of	 direct	 applicability	 of	 the	 norms	 of	
international	law.
When	deciding,	it	is	necessary	in	some	cases10	to	directly	use	the	Constitution	
and	not	only	 its	wording	but	also	the	 interpretation	of	the	Constitution,	as	
the	Constitution	Court	developed	in	its	final	decisions	(which	are	compulsory	
according	to	the	3rd	paragraph	of	the	1st	Article	of	the	Constitutional	Court	
Act)	 (Stupica,	 2013,	 p.	 27).	 The	 explanations	 of	 decisions	 of	 Constitutional	
Court	are	therefore	very	important	and	binding	for	the	understanding	of	the	
law.
The	Constitutional	Court	stated	in	 its	2010	decision:	“Administrative	bodies	
are	/	...	/	in	their	procedures	obliged	to	protect	the	constitutional	order	and	
human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms,	because	this	obligation	is	not	and	
cannot	be	detained	only	by	courts”.
It	 is	 true	 though	 that	 the	administrative	bodies	are	 in	accordance	with	 the	
principle	of	legality	bound	to	law	and	cannot	refuse	its	application	in	case	of	
doubt	 regarding	 its	compliance	with	 the	Constitution.	Furthermore,	during	
the	 process	 they	 are	 not	 entitled	 to	 set	 requirements	 for	 the	 assessment	
of	compliance	of	the	law	with	the	Constitution	on	the	Constitutional	Court,	
because	 this	 option	 is	 given	 only	 to	 the	 court	 (the	 156th	 Article	 of	 the	
Constitution).	 However,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 binding	 of	 administrative	
bodies	on	the	Constitution	and	the	obligation	to	respect	the	constitutional	
rights	of	 individuals	and	 legal	entities,	administrative	bodies	should	 in	case	
of	 deciding	 about	 rights,	 obligations	 or	 legal	 interests	 of	 the	 parties	 with	
potentially	unconstitutional	law,	warn	a	higher	authority.	The	higher	authority	
should	examine	this	and	in	case	of	doubt	regarding	the	constitutionality	of	
the	law	suggest	appropriate	action	of	the	highest	authority	of	the	executive	
9	 The	 Constitution,	 in	 the	 second	 paragraph	 of	 the	 153rd	 Article,	 states:	 “Laws	must	 be	 in	
compliance	with	 generally	 accepted	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 and	with	 valid	 treaties	
ratified	by	the	National	Assembly,	whereas	regulations	and	other	general	legal	acts	must	also	
be	in	conformity	with	other	ratified	treaties”.
10	The	Constitution,	in	the	15th	Article,	states:	”Human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	shall	
be	exercised	directly	on	the	basis	of	the	Constitution”.
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branch of government, who is in accordance with the Constitution and the 
law competent and responsible for suggesting change of the unconstitutional 
provision or requesting a review of the law at the Constitutional Court (U.S. 
UI-39/10-6).
From this decision, it can be with logical reasoning understood that:
•	 The administrative authorities, in addition to the courts, are also 
obliged to protect constitutional order as well as human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
•	 The administrative bodies cannot refuse application of law.
•	 The administrative bodies are bound by the Constitution and an 
obligation to respect the constitutional rights of individuals and 
legal entities, therefore they must ‘only’ inform superiors about the 
likelihood of unconstitutional law.
•	 If higher administrative bodies, after examining the views of a 
subordinate administrative bodies, consider that the views about 
unconstitutionality	 of	 law	 are	 justified,	 they	 make	 a	 proposal	 of	 an	
appropriate action to the highest authority of the executive branch of 
government.
It seems that such an understanding of judicata is too restrictive, because it 
does	not	provide	an	effective	protection	of	human	rights	and	fundamental	
freedoms.
However, by carefully reading the relevant judicial decision, the content 
might	be	understood	in	a	manner	that	it	applies	only	to	cases	not	specifically	
referring to human rights and fundamental freedoms of the II. Chapter of the 
Constitution	but	only	to	‘other	cases’	that	otherwise	affect	the	constitutional	
rights of individuals and legal entities.11 In favor of this proposition is the fact 
that the Constitutional Court wrote two formulations in the same judicial 
decision	 regarding	 the	 protection	 of	 constitutional	 rights.	 The	 first	 is	 as	
follows:
•	 “duty to respect the constitutional rights of individuals and legal 
entities”. 
The second formulation is as follows:
•	 “bound to protect constitutional order and human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”.
11 The decision of the Constitutional Court UI-39/10-6 shows that the initiator of proceedings 
before the Constitutional Court does not claim a lack of compliance with the provisions of the 
impugned	Act	Constitution	between	the	14th	and	the	65th	Article	that	define	human	rights	
and fundamental freedoms.
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In doing so, of course, the logical question is whether the ‘guidance’12 to 
administrative bodies in the judicial decision of the Constitutional Court 
regarding the obligation to respect the constitutional rights of individuals 
and legal entities is to be understood the same also in cases where the 
administrative bodies have to decide on matters that concern the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the II. Chapter of the Constitution. Does 
the linkage of administrative bodies to the principle of legality really mean that 
at the existence of the law and the norm of international law, which govern 
the specific question of the rights and obligations of the individual each in a 
different, conflicting way, administrative bodies should nevertheless use the 
law and ignore a directly applicable self-executing norm of international law 
that is at the same time, in the hierarchy of legal acts in the Slovenian legal 
order, above the law? Does the 15th Article of the Constitution due to the 
principle of legality not bind the administrative bodies to direct realization of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms?
Expressed simplistic questions indicate their own denial. What arguments can 
be given in favor of the denial of the questions?
Do not forget that the Constitutional Court decision in the actual case 
undoubtedly stated that the administrative bodies are obliged to protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Logically, this can only be done 
when they themselves do not violate them. This hypothesis can additionally 
be argued with the decision of the Constitutional Court in 1996, when it 
stated that judges are obliged to respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms ‘directly’ on the basis of the 15th Article of the Constitution (U.S. 
Up-155/95). The decision of the Constitutional Court U-I-39/10-6 does not 
reserve the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms only for 
the courts but also for administrative bodies, therefore it is by concluding 
with argument ad simili ad simile logical that the decision of the Constitutional 
Court Up-155/95, which talks about the direct application of the Constitution 
under the provisions of the 15th Article, is also binding on administrative 
bodies, despite the principle of legality.
This largely refers to the provision of the 120th Article of the Constitution, 
which states that administrative bodies perform their work within the 
framework and on the basis of the Constitution and laws. So also on the 
basis of the 15th Article of the Constitution! This also is not in an irresolvable 
conflict with the provisions of the 153rd Article of the Constitution, which 
states that individual acts and actions of state authorities must be based on a 
law or a regulation adopted pursuant to law. Treaties can also be considered 
12 Administrative authorities are in accordance with the principle of legality bound to the law and 
cannot refuse to use it in case of doubt in its compliance with the Constitution. Administrative 
authorities must alert a higher body, which should examine the issue and in case of doubt 
about the constitutionality of the Act propose appropriate action to the highest authority 
of the executive branch of government, which according to the Constitution and the law is 
competent and responsible for proposing a modification of the unconstitutional regulation 
or filing a request for assessment of law to the Constitutional Court.
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as regulations adopted pursuant to law (Sturm, 2002, p. 1009). Since there is 
no hierarchy among the sources of international law, certain self-executing 
norms of customary international law, which have in ‘material sense’ the 
necessary characteristics of regulation, may logically in a broader sense fall 
under regulations adopted pursuant to law. Take, for example, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which in Slovenia does not apply as a treaty, 
but there are specified norms as part of customary international law that are, 
according to the 8th Article of the Constitution, a part of the domestic legal 
order per se.
These arguments provide the basis for informed advocacy positions, stating 
that administrative bodies must in the case when deciding about the rights 
and obligations of legal entities that are classified in II. Chapter of the 
Constitution and are at the same time contradictorily regulated by law and 
the established norm of customary international law, use the latter that is 
directly based on the 15th Article of the Constitution.
8 Conclusion
In defining the problem of the topic covered, during the initial part of the 
paper a research question was posed. It concerns the ability to prove the 
existence of generally accepted principles of international law and their direct 
applicability by administrative bodies.
Generally accepted principles of international law are directly applicable in 
the legal order of the Republic of Slovenia according to settled case law of the 
Constitutional Court, although this is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. 
As this is usually the unwritten matter of a valid international law, there is the 
problem of recognition of these norms that apply in the legal order of the 
Republic of Slovenia per se. The user must locate them first in the relevant 
judgments of international tribunals. There is an additional obstacle. With 
the exception of the judgments of the European Union Court of Justice, 
Slovenia did not take care of appropriate Slovenian translations of relevant 
decisions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals. Furthermore, such 
decisions are also not collected in one place. What can be of assistance is 
the case law of the Constitutional Court, in which the Court already rejected 
or recognized unwritten norms of customary international law. But there 
are not a lot of these types of decisions. One can also help oneself with the 
specialized literature in the field of customary international law in which 
recognized international legal experts deal with concrete matters of this 
kind. Obviously, the problem of identifying the generally accepted principles 
of international law exists and is not systemically solved. It is left to the skills 
and resourcefulness of the individual users of the law.
Although the generally accepted principles of international law are used in the 
Slovenian legal order per se, it is not fully clear how the administrative bodies 
should respond in situations where the rights and obligations of legal entities 
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are at the same time protected by law and well established international law 
but are contradictory. By carefully reading the contents of the judgment of 
the Constitutional Court UI-39/10-6, two situations can be understood. The 
first situation is that the administrative bodies must, in case of a controversial 
law governing the ‘constitutional rights of individuals or legal entities’, inform 
the higher body, which must in the case of a confirmed doubt propose an 
appropriate action to the highest authority of the executive branch of 
government. The latter is, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, 
competent and responsible to propose a change of the unconstitutional 
regulation or to request a review of the law at the Constitutional Court. The 
second situation is when the controversial law governs the ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’ from the II. Chapter of the Constitution. In such cases, 
there are arguments that the administrative body, in spite of the principle of 
legality, should, on the basis of the 15th Article of the Constitution, use the 
self-executing norm of customary international law.
Anton Olaj is Doctor of Laws. In his research he is engaged particularly in 
studying generally accepted principles of international law and their application 
in domestic law.
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